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Abstract 
We investigate how integration of bank ownership across states has affected 
economic volatility within states.  In theory, bank integration could cause higher or lower 
volatility, depending on whether credit supply or credit demand shocks predominate.  In 
fact, year-to-year fluctuations in a state’s economic growth fall as its banks become more 
integrated (via holding companies) with banks in other states.  As the bank linkages 
between any pair of states increases, fluctuations in those two states tend to converge.  
We conclude that interstate banking has made state business cycles smaller, but more 
alike.
* The authors’ views do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve or the Swiss National Bank.  
We thank Lawrence Katz, Edward Glaeser, Jean Tirole and anonymous referees for their comments.   1
I.  Introduction 
The United States banking system was once anything but united.   Until 1978, 
every state in the union barred banks from other states, so instead of one national banking 
system we had more like 50 little banking systems, one per state.
1  Once states opened 
their borders to out-of-state banks, bank holding companies marched in and bought up (or 
merged with) banks all over the country.  In 1975, just ten percent of the bank assets in 
the typical state were owned by a multi-state bank holding company.  By 1994, this 
interstate bank asset ratio had risen to 60 percent (Figure I).  Our paper investigates how 
the advent of interstate banking integration in the United States has affected economic 
volatility within states.   
With the United States’ balkanized banking system, the fate of a state and its 
banks were closely tied; as went the state, so went the banks.  The farm price deflation in 
the early 1980s bankrupted many farmers and many farm banks.  Falling oil prices in the 
mid-80s wiped out a lot of Texans and a lot of Texas banks.  Shocks to commodity prices 
probably caused these contractions, but frictions in the banking sector may have 
aggravated them.  By allowing a freer flow of bank capital and lending among states, we 
maintain that interstate banking will reduce the drag that banking frictions can have on 
economic contractions.     
Precisely how bank integration affects volatility—by what mechanism—is far 
from obvious.  The literature on international capital (stock and bond) market integration 
focuses on the risk sharing and consumption smoothing provided by cross-country asset 
1     Most states also prohibited branching into other cities within the state, so we really had countless little 
banking systems, one per city.  2
holdings.
2  On the question of volatility, however, the real business cycle models popular 
in that literature suggest that capital market integration may increase output (versus 
consumption) volatility within countries as capital can flow from slumping economies 
toward booming ones.  
Williamson [1989] studies an early form of bank integration in his comparison of 
the experiences of the Unites States and Canada during the Depression.  Canadian banks 
were highly integrated across provinces during the 1930s, and virtually all survived the 
Depression.  U.S. banks were highly fragmented across states, and thousands failed 
during the Depression.  Despite the stark differences in bank structure and performance, 
the economic contraction in Canada was as severe as it was in the United States.  Bank 
integration may stabilize the banking system, he concludes, but not necessarily output.  
Our interstate version of the banking model in Holmstrom and Tirole [1997] 
produces a similar sort of ambiguity about the relationship between integration and 
volatility.  The increased mobility of bank capital under interstate banking tends to 
dampen the adverse effect of bank capital/loan supply shocks on state lending and 
spending, we argue, while amplifying the impact of firm collateral/loan demand shocks.  
Whether the net effect is more or less volatility ultimately depends on which shocks 
matter most. 
In this paper, we estimate reduced form regressions with measures of state-level 
fluctuations in economic growth on the one side and measures of interstate bank linkages 
on the other.  We test whether interstate integration is associated with smaller or larger 
2     We do not consider the possible risk-sharing and consumption smoothing benefits of interstate banking.  
Even when the U.S. was fragmented, savers could share risk via stock and (municipal) bond markets.  In 
fact, Asdrubali et al. [1996] find that U.S. capital markets play a more vital role in income and consumption 
smoothing across states than do credit markets.3
fluctuations within states.  Using a panel of state-year data over 1976-1994, we find that 
growth fluctuations within a state subside significantly as that state’s banks become more 
closely linked to banks in other states.  The declines in volatility are especially 
pronounced in “oil” states.  We also find that as banks in any two particular states 
become more linked, business cycles in those states tend to converge.  Additional 
evidence suggests that this stabilization and convergence do not reflect endogenous 
integration or mere coincidence, hence our conclusion: Interstate banking has made state 
business cycles smaller, and more alike.
3
Our findings should inform other research.  Interstate banking should be 
considered as still another explanation for the downward trend in aggregate U.S. 
economic volatility documented by McConnell and Perez-Quiros [2000] and Blanchard 
and Simon [2001].  Reduced volatility of inventory investment has been advanced as one 
explanation of that trend; better finance via interstate banking may explain smoother 
inventory investment.  Increased mobility of bank capital may also reduce the 
surprisingly large labor flows whereby state economies adjust to shocks [Blanchard and 
Katz, 1992].   The stabilizing benefits of interstate banking in the United States are also 
relevant to the bank integration in Europe, and financial “globalization” generally.  
3     In more speculative analysis, Morgan, Rime and Strahan [2003] investigate the possible mechanisms 
linking banking integration to economic fluctuations.  We computed the correlation between collateral 
values (based on housing prices) and economic growth, and between bank capital (based on book values, 
from Call Reports) and economic growth.  Consistent with theory, the collateral-growth correlation 
increases significantly with banking integration, whereas the bank capital-growth correlation weakens with 
integration.  Integration therefore seems to stabilize by reducing a state’s vulnerability to downturns in its 
local banking system.  This stabilizing force outweighs a state’s greater sensitivity to changes in the value 
of collateral.  Because we are not able to isolate exogenous shocks to collateral and bank capital, this 
analysis is difficult to interpret structurally.4
II. Banking Geography: A Brief History 
By geography, we mean the myriad state and federal laws that have limited where 
banks operate.  The history can be confusing because banks can expand within states or 
between them, and they can expand by several means.  Branching is the simplest and 
cheapest way to grow because branches do not require separate charters, capital, 
management teams or boards of directors.  When branching is forbidden, a bank can 
grow by buying other banks, or by opening new (de novo) ones.  Four cases are possible 
(hence the potential confusion): interstate banking, interstate branching, intrastate 
banking, and intrastate branching.
4
The Douglas Amendment to the 1956 Bank Holding Company (HC) Act gave 
states the prerogative to exclude out-of-state banks or holding companies from buying or 
building a bank or branch in their state.  All states exercised this option, effectively 
barring interstate banking.  In 1978 Maine passed a law allowing entry by bank holding 
companies from any state that allowed entry by Maine banks.  Alaska, Massachusetts, 
and New York passed similar laws in 1982.  By 1992, all states but Hawaii had passed 
reciprocal entry laws of some sort.  
 The transition to interstate banking was completed with passage of the Reigle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.  Reigle-Neal made 
interstate banking a bank right, not a state right; banks or holding companies could now 
enter another state without permission. 
One more piece of legislation bears mention.  In 1982, federal legislators 
amended the Bank Holding Company Act to permit the acquisition of failed thrifts and 
4 Adding to the confusion is the bank vs. bank holding company distinction: a bank holding company 
(BHC) is just a corporate entity comprising one or more separately chartered banks.5
banks by out-of-state banks or holding companies.  Banks and thrifts failed by the 
hundreds in some states in the early 1980s after the recessions of 1980 and 1981-82 and 
the “third world debt” crises.  Surviving institutions in hard-hit states were often not fit to 
re-capitalize the failed ones, so Congress acted to let in healthy banks from out-of-state.  
Note that the interstate banking boom following this act coincided with severe downturns 
in certain states.  We bring this up again later.   
States were also relaxing restrictions on intrastate branching in the 1970s and 
1980s.  Table I lists states by the year they entered an interstate banking compact and the 
year they permitted intrastate branching.  States deregulated in waves, or cohorts, rather 
than all at once, which we exploit in identifying how interstate banking affects 
fluctuations in economic growth within states. 
III. Interstate Banking Does Not Necessarily Reduce Volatility 
Our interstate version of Holmstrom and Tiroles’ [HT 1997] banking model 
suggests that bank integration could cause higher or lower volatility.  Bankers in the HT 
model can prevent moral hazard by monitoring firms, but they can also commit moral 
hazard by neglecting to monitor.  These frictions make the flow of credit and investment 
spending dependent on the stock of firm collateral and bank capital; contractions in either 
cause contractions in aggregate investment spending.     
Our interstate version of the model includes a second physical place (“state”) 
where bank capital can flow (Appendix).  We compare the impact of collateral and bank 
capital shocks under an interstate banking regime, where capital can flow freely across 
states, versus an intrastate regime where capital flows across states is restricted.  6
Collateral and capital shocks are still contractionary under interstate banking, but the 
magnitudes change: bank capital shocks have a smaller impact on investment under 
interstate banking, while the impact of firm collateral shocks gets amplified by interstate 
banking.  The intuition is simple: a holding company operating banks in two states will 
import capital to state A if the returns to lending the banks’ capital are still good, but a 
collateral shock in state A will lead the holding company to export capital and lending 
away from that state.   
If we identify bank capital and firm collateral with loan supply and demand 
curves, we can illustrate these ideas graphically (Figure II).  With a segregated banking 
system, a reduction in bank loan supply in state A increased bank returns in A, but has no 
affect on credit markets in state B; borrowers in state A bear the full brunt of the shock in 
the form of higher loan interest rates (ȕA in Figure II) and smaller loan quantities (LA in 
Figure II).  Under interstate banking, by contrast, the higher return on bank capital in 
state A attracts credit from state B. The inflow from B partially offsets the initial impact 
on loans supplied in state A.  When loan demand is weak in state A, due to declines in 
borrower wealth or collateral, integration amplifies the decline in investment by 
facilitating the flow of banking resources out of state A and into B (Panel B).  The main 
point we take from this model is that integration could be positively or negatively related 
to volatility, depending on whether loan supply or demand shocks are the larger source of 
volatility.  In the next section we test whether integration following banking deregulation 
was followed by more or less economic volatility.  7
IV. Regression Strategy and Data 
  To test if state volatility has changed with banking integration, we estimate 
regressions with the following structure:  
(1)  Fluctuationit = a i + at+ βxIntegration measureit + İit .
Fluctuationit equals the absolute deviation from conditional mean growth in either gross 
state product, employment, or personal income, where the conditional means are 
estimated by regressing growth rates in each state-year on dummy variables indicating 
year, state, and indicator variables for whether the state permitted interstate banking and 
intrastate branching (discussed below).  In particular: 
(2) Growthit =  c i + ct+ Ȗ x Deregulation Indicatorsit + Ȟit ,
and
(3) Fluctuationit  = ŇȞitŇ.
Roughly speaking, the fluctuation in economic growth for a given state-year equals the 
size of the deviation from average growth for that state (over 1976-94) and from average 
growth for all states in that year.
5
Banking integration is measured by two variables.  Both measures use interstate 
banking affiliations via bank holding companies.  Holding company affiliations are really 
the only way to measure interstate bank integration (interstate credit flows are not 
available), but it is the right conceptual measure for our purposes.  Houston, James and 
Marcus [1997] show that loan growth of a subsidiary bank depends more on cash flow 
5 We prefer to model absolute rather than squared deviations for two reasons.  First, absolute deviations 
maintain the same units as growth, so the coefficients are easily interpreted.  Second, the squared deviations 
exhibited very large outliers for several small states (e.g. Alaska, North Dakota and Wyoming).  When 
these states are dropped, the results are similar using squared deviations to those reported below in terms of 
economic and statistical significance.  When these three states are included, the coefficients on banking 8
and capital of the holding company than on the subsidiary’s own cash flow and capital.  
They conclude that holding companies represent internal capital markets through which 
scarce funds get allocated among subsidiary banks in different locations.  These internal 
capital market flows are precisely the flows that will transmit economic shocks across 
states.
6
  The first measure of integration, the interstate asset ratio, equals the fraction of 
bank assets in state i that are owned by a holding company that owns bank assets in one 
or more other states.  Suppose bank assets are distributed across states A and B like this:    
A          B 
1         10
2         20,
where each number represents a bank and the amount of its assets.  If A1 and B10 are
jointly owned (by a holding company) but A2 and B20 are unaffiliated, interstate asset 
ratio equals 1/3 for both states.
  The second measure, other state asset ratio, equals total out-of-state assets held 
by holding companies operating in the state, divided by total assets in that state.  Other 
state asset ratio equals 10/3 for state A in the example above and 1/30 for state B. The
other state asset ratio captures differences in state or banking system size that the 
interstate asset ratio misses entirely. In the example above, capital flows from state B to 
state A may matter a lot to A, but flows the other way may hardly matter to state B.
7  The 
integration lose significance for deviations in both income and gross state product growth but remain about 
the same for employment growth (which does not have the outlier problem). 
6 Ashcraft [forthcoming] finds federal funds rate shocks have a smaller impact on bank lending in states 
where banks are better linked (via holding companies) with banks in other states.
7 Interstate asset ratio, by contrast, captures changes that are missed by other state asset ratio.
Interstate asset ratio for state A would increase from 1/3 to 1 if, in the example above, B10 acquired A2, 9
correlation between interstate asset ratio and other state asset ratio over 1976-94 was 
0.34, so they do measure different dimensions of integration. 
We take other state asset ratio as given because it depends mostly on a state’s 
(relative) size and location, factors that are largely exogenous with respect to the size of a 
fluctuation in a given state-year.  Nevada has a high other state asset ratio because it 
happens to be near California.
8 Interstate asset ratio, by contrast, might be correlated 
with contemporaneous fluctuations in a state.  Economic contractions, especially if 
accompanied by banking crises, may attract bargain-hunting banks from other states (or 
drive local banks to look outward for lending opportunities).  A positive correlation 
between fluctuations in a given state-year and the interstate asset ratio in that state-year 
would bias the OLS estimates upwards. 
To address that potential bias, we report instrumental variable (IV) regressions 
using three deregulation indicators as instruments for interstate asset ratio (as well as 
other state asset ratio and labor shares, as discussed below).  The first indicator, after 
interstate deregulation, switches on (from zero to one) the year a state permits entry by 
out-of-state banks and stays on thereafter.  Five years after interstate deregulation
switches on five years after deregulation and stays on thereafter.
9 After intrastate 
branching, the third indicator variable, switches on the year a state permitted its own 
banks to branch within the state.
10
but other state asset ratio would not change.  The change in interstate asset ratio would capture the 
potential for credit from B10 to flow throughout state A. 
8 Hawaii never passed an interstate banking agreement (before Congress did), presumably because it is 
so distant from every other state. 
9      Lagging allows for delays between deregulation and the actual mergers and acquisitions that increase 
interstate bank affiliations. 
10     Using intrastate branching to instrument for interstate banking is odd, but we wanted a complete 
measure of states’ stance toward geographic expansion, whether inward or outward. None of our 10
The first stage regressing of interstate asset ratio on these indicators (reported 
below) measures the change in that ratio within a state after deregulation, and the 
difference in that ratio between deregulated states and still regulated states.  As long as 
state deregulation is not driven by contemporaneous fluctuations in a state (evidence on 
that later), changes in interstate asset ratio after deregulation can be taken as exogenous 
with respect to current fluctuations in a given state.
11
Over time, a contemporaneous correlation might show up as a constant difference 
in the relationship between fluctuations and interstate asset ratio.  States that are prone to 
big cycles (because of different resource endowments, say) and banking crises may wind 
up more integrated if the banking crises are followed by waves of buyouts from banks in 
other states.  We deal with this possibility by including fixed state effects that eliminate 
any constant differences (across states) in fluctuations.  We also report regressions that 
include labor force composition as well; big mining (oil, gas, or mineral) states may be 
subject to bigger fluctuations than big government states, for example.  We also include 
the sum of squared labor shares as a measure of labor force concentration.  All else equal, 
we would expect states with less diversified economies to be more volatile.   
Table II summarizes our data, definitions, etc.  All data (except gross state 
product) start in 1976, just before Maine passed the first interstate banking law (GSP data 
start in 1978).  All data end in 1994, the year Congress passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking Act.  Apart from its symbolic importance, certain bookkeeping consolidations 
conclusions depend on this variable. Conceivably, states that permit branching may attract more interstate 
linkages from holding companies that seek a presence all over a state. 
11 If deregulation does depend on the contemporaneous fluctuations in a state, then our instruments are 
endogenous too. 11
enabled by Reigle-Neal make it impossible to distinguish holding company assets in 
different states.
12
A few summary statistics in Table II warrant note.  Other state asset ratio is
roughly ten times larger than interstate asset ratio (because of the different numerator in 
each ratio).  The three measures of state economic activity—employment, income, and 
gross product—grew 2.0 - 2.3 percent per year over the relevant sample period.  Our 
measure of fluctuations in growth averaged 1.1 percent for employment, 1.5 percent for 
personal income, and 2.3 percent for gross product.  Our conditional measure of 
fluctuation in each series is only half as large as the corresponding standard deviation, but 
the rankings are identical: employment fluctuates least, gross product most (income in the 
middle).
13  Note that mining employment is highly variable (relative to its mean share of 
employment).  The high standard deviation of mining employment reflects both the ups 
and downs in this sector within states, and the larger variation in the mining share across 
states. 
   Figure III plots interstate asset ratio by state cohorts, grouped by when the state 
first permitted interstate banking.
14  The surge in several states in the mid-1980s reflects 
the buying of failed banks and thrifts enabled by Congress in 1982.  
  Figure IV plots the change (difference-in-differences) in employment growth 
fluctuations before and after deregulation.  We computed the change in the mean 
12 Reigle-Neal enables a holding company to consolidate businesses across states into its headquarter 
bank.  For example, when NationsBank consolidated into its headquarters in North Carolina (NationsBank 
NC N.A.), its “North Carolina assets” more than doubled between 1994 and 1995. 
13     Gross product growth fluctuates more than personal income growth because personal income also 
includes residents’ income earned in other states (stock market wealth, etc.).  Income from other states may 
diversify residents against changes in income from their own state.
14 Positive levels of interstate asset ratio before deregulation represent assets of multi-state bank 
holding companies that predated the Douglas Amendment (that were grandfathered under that act). 12
employment growth volatility after interstate banking reform, relative to the change in 
volatility over the same years in states that were still regulated.  Though a bit crude 
(because the “control group” composition changes as more states deregulate), this 
calculation reveals whether most states experienced more or less volatility after 
deregulation.  In fact, all but four states experienced lower employment growth 
fluctuations after deregulation.
15  Some of the largest declines were in “oil states” 
[Blanchard and Katz, 1992]: Wyoming (WY), Montana (MT), Oklahoma (OK), Texas 
(TX), North Dakota (ND), and Louisiana (LA).
16
V. Results 
V.1. Main Findings 
Table III reports coefficients from a set of preliminary regressions.  The standard 
errors are clustered by states to allow for correlation across states [Bertrand et al., 
2004].
17  Also reported [in square brackets] are 95 percent confidence intervals generated 
by repeated sampling over state-clusters.  Sampling over states reveals whether results 
depend on particular states (oil states, for example). 
The first regression shows that interstate asset ratio increased significantly—by 
14 to 17 percentage points—after deregulation.   Five years after deregulation is also 
significant, suggesting a long-run increase in the interstate asset ratio of 21 to 25 
percentage points.  The “within” R
2 is 71 percent with labor shares, 66 percent without.  
15 Using a similar analysis, we find declines in personal income growth volatility in 39 of 48 states, and 
we find declines in gross state product volatility in 37 of 48 states. 
16 Blanchard and Katz [1992, p. 10] define oil and mineral states as states where two percent or more of 
total state earnings are derived from oil and mineral earnings (in 1980). Their list comprises the five states 
listed in the text, plus Alaska (AL), Colorado (CO), New Mexico (NM), and West Virginia (WV).13
This first regression is also the first-stage for the IV regressions we report later.  The 
significance of both deregulation indicators and the decent R
2 suggest that our instrument 
set is reasonable.
18
  The other regressions in Table III show that fluctuations in all three growth 
measures—gross product, income, and employment—tend to subside after interstate 
deregulation.  These regressions can be interpreted as reduced form models linking 
changes in regulations directly to economic volatility.  The decline after reform is 
significant for every measure when the regressions include the labor shares.  Without the 
labor shares, the decline in employment and gross state product fluctuations is significant, 
but the decline in personal income is not.
19  The results also suggest (weakly) that the 
effects of deregulation on volatility build over time -- the coefficients on five years after 
interstate deregulation are always negative (although not significantly so).  This result is 
consistent with the changes in banking integration, which also increase gradually after a 
state deregulates restrictions on interstate banking. 
  Table IV reports OLS (fixed effect) regressions of fluctuations on our banking 
integration measures.  Other state asset ratio—the exogenous measure—enters negatively 
in every regression.  Its coefficient is significant between the five percent and ten percent 
level.  The ninety-five percent confidence interval is centered in the negative range, but it 
reaches into the positive range. 
17 Our adjustment follows Bertrand et al. [2004], who study this problem in the context of difference-in-
differences estimators and recommend clustering observations by state. 
18 The insignificance of intrastate branching deregulation means that permitting branching within a 
state is not associated with increased affiliation across states.  
19 Income can come from out of state, so it makes sense that income fluctuations are less sensitive to 
bank integration.  14
  Interstate asset ratio—the endogenous measure—enters negatively in five of six 
regressions, but the coefficient is never statistically significant.  The associated 
confidence interval is centered in the negative range, but the intervals are wide.  When 
the labor shares are included, the coefficient on interstate asset ratio is two-to-six times 
more negative.  This interaction reinforces the possibility (raised above) that interstate 
asset ratio might be higher in states that are inherently more volatile (because of their 
resource endowment) because such states are more prone to banking crises and buyouts 
by banks in other states (if permitted).  Controlling for labor shares—a reasonable proxy 
for endowments—this apparent bias in the OLS estimates is diminished.
20
  Table V reports instrumental variable (IV) regressions, where the instruments for 
interstate asset ratio are other state asset ratio, the labor shares, and the deregulation 
indicators.  The IV estimates of interstate asset ratio are significant in all but one 
regression, and in every regression that includes labor shares.  The IV estimates imply a 
substantial stabilizing effect of interstate bank affiliations, especially given labor shares.  
A state with interstate asset ratio 0.28 above average (one standard deviation) would 
have fluctuations in personal income growth 0.9 percentage points (0.28x0.032x100) 
lower than a state where interstate asset ratio was average.  The typical fluctuation in 
personal income growth was 1.6 percent, so 0.9 is sizable.
21
V.2. Endogenous deregulation does not explain reduced volatility
20 The coefficient on other state asset share, by contrast, is not nearly as sensitive to inclusion of the 
labor shares. The insensitivity of the other state asset coefficient to labor mix reinforces our treatment of 
that measure as largely accidental, or exogenous measure reflecting state size and location (near big or 
large states) and not fluctuations within the state. 
21 We found similar results when we allowed a full set of interactions between the year effects and the 
state-level industry employment share variables (in case the impact of the aggregate shock depends on a 
state’s industry mix).  In an earlier draft, we found a more pronounced stabilizing effect of integration in 
small states. 15
Our deregulation instruments might be correlated with contemporaneous 
fluctuations in a state.  Economic fluctuations, especially contractions, may pressure 
legislators to allow entry by out-of-state banks or exit by local banks seeking greener 
pastures.  If so, smaller fluctuations after deregulation might just reflect increased 
volatility before deregulation and reversion to average fluctuations after.  Not so.  In 
Table VI we re-estimate the regulatory reduced form models from Table III with an 
additional indicator variable equal to one during the five-year period preceding regulatory 
change.  This indicator never enters significantly positive; nor does its inclusion in the 
model change the main results.  All three fluctuation measures subside after deregulation 
(significantly so for employment and gross state product), but none were unusually high 
in the five years prior to deregulation.
22
V.3. Convergence in state cycles 
Banking integration also affects the spillover of credit shocks from one state to 
others.  Whether integration causes state cycles to become more or less alike, however,
depends on whether supply or demand shocks are the predominant source of disruptions 
to credit markets.  Recall Figure II.  If bank capital/loan supply contracts in state A,a
holding company in A will import bank capital from some healthier state where it also 
holds banks, say B.  The capital import from B contracts loan supply there and expands 
loan supply in A, thus narrowing the divergence in lending (and spending) between A and
B (compared to an intrastate banking structure with immobile capital).
23 A contraction in 
loan demand in A (and the resulting decline in bank capital returns) motivates interstate 
22 The five years prior to interstate deregulation dummy in the Table VI regressions effectively 
“dummies out” those years.   16
holding companies to shift capital from A to B.  The capital exported from A contracts 
loan supply there (further reducing the quantity of lending in A), and expands loan supply 
in B, thus widening the divergence between A and B (compared to intrastate banking).  
The net effect is ambiguous; whether differences between state fluctuations widen or 
narrow with interstate banking depends on which shock—loan supply or loan demand—
predominates.  Given our finding that fluctuations fall after interstate banking 
deregulation, we can infer that loan supply/capital shocks predominate (else we would 
have found the opposite).  Hence, we expect interstate banking will narrow differences 
between state business cycles.   
We test this “integration cum convergence” hypothesis here using pair-wise 
comparisons across states.  For every pair of states over 1976-94 (state-pair-year), we 
computed the value of bank assets in the two states (say A and B) that are jointly owned 
(by a holding company), divided by the sum of bank assets in A and B.  The higher that 
ratio, the more integrated the two states banking systems.  As a discrete alternative, we 
also constructed an indicator that switches on (from zero to one) if A and B have any
bank assets that are jointly owned.  The dependent variable equals the absolute difference 
in the growth residual between state pairs in a given year, where the growth residual (Ȟit)
is computed as before (see Equation (2) above).  To be precise: 
(4)  Absolute Difference in Growthi,j,t = Ň Ȟit - Ȟjt Ň.
We expected a smaller difference between growth in A and B as their banks become more 
integrated (and compared to other, less integrated, state-pairs).  To construct standard 
errors, we cluster the data for each state-year. 
23 Peek and Rosengren [2000] find that the capital contractions of Japanese banks in the 1990s caused 
them to reduce their lending in the U.S. (California in particular).17
In fact, states’ cycles do converge along with their banking systems (Table VII).  
Absolute differences between growth in all three measures—employment, personal 
income, and gross product—decline significantly as the share of commonly owned bank 
assets increases.  The indicator of any jointly owned assets is also significant in every 
regression.  The absolute difference in employment growth is 0.4 percentage points lower 
for states with some jointly owned assets than for states whose banking sectors are 
completely segregated (column 2).  The mean absolute difference in employment growth 
is 1.6 percent.  Note that business cycles differences increase with differences between 
states’ industry mix, as we would expect, but interstate bank linkages narrow business 
cycle differences even after controlling for differences in labor force composition.
24
V.4. Interstate trade does not explain our results
  The negative correlation between bank integration and state business fluctuations 
is almost certainly not an artifact of increased trade (“real” integration) among the states.   
It is not obvious that trade is stabilizing; trade permits specialization, and specialization is 
the opposite of diversification.  Recall from Tables III and IV that fluctuations in state 
income and output growth increase with the sum of squared labor shares (a measure of 
concentration).  If anything, increased trade (if it begets specialization) might cause larger 
fluctuations.  We also examined the data available on interstate shipping (as a proxy for 
trade), and found no correlation between the change in interstate shipping between 1977 
and 1993 for each state and the corresponding change in interstate asset ratios.
25
24     The difference between two states’ industry mix is measured by the square root of the sum of squared 
differences between the two states’ employment shares in the eight one-digit SIC sectors listed in Table 1. 
The regressions in Table VII also include state-pair fixed effects to absorb permanent similarities between 
states (such as proximity) and annual fixed effects to remove trends.  
25     Out-of-state shipping ratios are available periodically from the Commodity Flow Surveys conducted 
by the Department of Transportation and the Department of Commerce.  The closest surveys to our (1976-18
VI. Conclusion 
  The Unites States once had 50 little banking systems, one in every state.  Now we 
have a much more integrated banking system, with holding companies operating banks 
across many states.  Interstate banking appears to have helped stabilize growth 
fluctuations within states, and to reduce divergence between states.  State business cycles 
have become smaller, in other words, but more alike.   
  This conclusion has implications in several dimensions.  Banks in Europe are still 
relatively disintegrated across nations [Berger 2003].  As integration accelerates, along 
with unification generally, our findings suggest that business cycles in European nations 
will also diminish and converge.  Interstate bank integration may also help explain the 
decline in aggregate U.S. economic volatility over the past twenty years documented in 
McConnell and Perez-Quiros [2000] and Blanchard and Simon [2001].  Researchers have 
already ventured several explanations for this trend; better finance via bank integration 
may be yet another.
26  Our findings also relate to “regional evolutions” studied by 
Blanchard and Katz [1992].  They find that labor migration played a surprisingly large 
role in the adjustment of state economies to shocks.  By increasing the ease with which 
financial capital can flow into states, banking integration could potentially reduce the 
incentive for people to leave states during downturns.  It would be interesting to test 
94) sample were in 1977 and 1993.  We plot the data in Morgan et al [2003] but omit that plot here for 
brevity.  The correlation of 0.103 was not significantly different from zero (p value = .49).
26 Better inventory management [Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2002], reduced volatility of sales 
with non-convexities in the production process [Ramey and Vine, 2001], better monetary policy [Blanchard 
and Simon, 2001], and better luck [Stock and Watson, 2001]. Better finance fits best with the inventory-
management hypothesis.  According to this view, firms began smoothing production better in the post-1984 
period by building up inventories during periods of low sales growth, and vice versa during period of high 
sales growth [Kahn, et al, 2002].  These counter-cyclical movements in inventories are only possible if 
banks are able to provide counter-cyclical credit; interstate banking may contribute in that direction.  19
whether increased mobility of bank capital, via interstate banking, has altered the role of 
labor mobility in the adjustment to shocks.   20
Appendix: Interstate Banking in the Holmström and Tirole (HT) model.
27
  The basic model comprises firms, banks, and investors.  All are risk neutral. 
Firms choose between a good project and either of two bad projects.  The “good” project 
succeeds with probability H p ; both “bad” projects succeed with probability L p .  A key 
parameter in the model is the good and bad projects’ relative likelihood of success: 
0 > − = ∆ L H p p p .  All of the projects return R  (per-unit invested) if they succeed 
and 0 if not.   The two bad projects also produce differing amounts of private benefits to 
the firm: type b bad projects produce a small private benefit (b); type B bad projects 
produce a larger private benefit (B >b ).   Banks can prevent B investments by 
monitoring, but not b investment.  Monitoring costs c per unit of investment. Banks must 
invest enough of their own capital in the project to be credible monitors.  
 Contracts.  Firms borrow from both the bank (informed capital) and investors 
(uninformed capital).  If the project succeeds, the firm, bank monitor, and uninformed 
investors receive Rf, Rm and Ru. Rf must be large enough to induce the firm to choose 
the good project ( p bI Rf ∆ ≥ / ). Rm must be large enough to induce the bank to monitor 
( p cI Rm ∆ ≥ / ). At equilibrium, the two incentives constraints and the firm’s budget 
constraint will bind. The maximum pledgeable income, defined by HT as the maximum 
expected income per unit of investment that can be promised to uninformed investors 
without destroying incentives, is then equal to ) / ) ( ( p c b R pH ∆ + − .
Intrastate Banking 
27 Morgan et al. (2003) elaborate on this interstate version of the HT model.21
By intrastate banking, we mean informed capital is completely immobile across 
states.  That immobility means the equilibrium in each state is the same as in the HT’s 
one state model.  Let γ  and β  denote the rates of return required by uninformed 
investors and by banks, respectively. Let  1 Kf  be the aggregate amount of firm capital in 
state 1,  1 Km  the aggregate amount of informed capital in state 1, and  1 Ku  the aggregate 
supply of uninformed capital in state 1. The first two are fixed, while the third is 
determined so that the demand for uninformed capital (the sum of the pledgeable 
expected returns of individual firms, discounted byγ) equals the supply of uninformed 
capital.  Equilibrium in the uninformed capital market in state 1 requires   
()
1
1 1 1 / ) ( ) (
Ku
p c b R Ku Km Kf pH =
∆ + − + +
γ
.
The equilibrium quantity of uninformed capital in state 1 is determined by 
γ ⋅ ∆ + ∆ ⋅ − +
+ ∆ ⋅ + − −
=
p p R c b p





) )( ( 1 1
1 .
The equilibrium rates of return in informed capital markets is defined by 
    ) /( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 p Km Ku Km Kf c pH ∆ ⋅ + + ⋅ = β .
Interstate banking.  Under interstate banking, we assume that informed capital can move 
freely to equalize β  across states. Define  1 π  as the share of aggregate informed capital 
(Km1+Km2) invested in state 1. Let 
i Ku1and
i Ku2  be the quantities of uninformed capital 
attracted by firms in each state (note the superscript i for interstate banking). Equilibrium 
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The equilibrium quantities attracted by firms in each state and the share of informed 
capital invested in state 1 are 
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  The negative impact of a bank capital crunch in state 1 (a decrease in 1 Km ) on the 
amount of informed and of uninformed capital invested in state 1 is smaller under 
interstate banking.  Intuitively, the increase inβ  caused by the bank capital crunch 
attracts bank capital from state 2.  This capital inflow mitigates the impact of the bank 
capital crunch on the availability of external finance in two ways.  First, the bank capital 
inflow leads to a lower decrease in the amount lent by banks to firms in state 1 (this effect 
is shown in Figure I, Panel A).  Second, because the amount lent by banks to firms in 
state 1 decreases less, we also have a smaller reduction in the pledgeable income that can 
be promised to uninformed investors by firms in state 1.  As a result, we have a smaller 23
reduction in the amount of uninformed capital that firms in state 1 can attract.  With unit 
banking, these mitigating effects do not take place, since bank capital cannot move across 
states. Formally, proposition 1 implies  1 2 1 1 / ) ( Km Km Km ∂ + ∂π  <  1 1 / Km Km ∂ ∂  and 
1 1 Km Ku
i ∂ ∂ < 1 1 Km Ku ∂ ∂ .  The proofs, available from the authors, are straightforward 
under the symmetry conditions  2 1 Kf Kf =  and  2 1 Km Km =  at initial values. 
The negative impact of a collateral squeeze in state 1 (a decrease in 1 Kf ) on the 
amount of uninformed and informed capital invested in state 1 s larger under interstate 
banking.  With interstate banking, the decrease inβ  after the collateral squeeze drives 
bank capital from state 1 to state 2.  Here again, two effects must be distinguished.  First, 
the bank capital flight leads to a decrease in the amount lent by banks to firms in state 1 
(this effect is shown in Figure I, Panel B).  Second, because of this reduction of the 
amount lent by banks to state 1 firms, we also have a decrease in the pledgeable income 
that can be promised to uninformed investors.  As a result, firms in state 1 can attract less 
uninformed capital.  With unit banking, these amplifying effects do not take place, since 
bank capital cannot move across states.  
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Swiss National Bank 
Boston College, Wharton Financial Institutions Center, and National Bureau of Economic 
Research  24
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States (acronym), By the Year Out-of-State Bank Entry and Intrastate Branching Permitted  
Interstate banking:  Intrastate branching:
Maine (ME)  1978  1975 
Alaska (AK)  1982  * 
New York (NY)  1982  1976 
Connecticut (CT)  1983  1980 
Massachusetts (MA)  1983  1984 
Kentucky (KY)  1984  1990 
Rhode Island (RI)  1984  * 
Utah (UT)  1984  1981 
Washington, DC (DC)  1985  * 
Florida (FL)  1985  1988 
Georgia (GA)  1985  1983 
Idaho (ID)  1985  * 
Maryland (MD)  1985  * 
Nevada (NV)  1985  * 
North Carolina (NC)  1985  * 
Ohio (OH)  1985  1979 
Tennessee (TN)  1985  1985 
Virginia (VA)  1985  1978 
Arizona (AZ)  1986  * 
Illinois (IL)  1986  1988 
Indiana (IN)  1986  1989 
Michigan (MI)  1986  1987 
Minnesota (MN)  1986  1993 
Missouri (MO)  1986  1990 
New Jersey (NJ)  1986  1977 
Oregon (OR)  1986  1985 
Pennsylvania (PA)  1986  1982 
South Carolina (SC)  1986  * 
Alabama (AL)  1987  1981 
California (CA)  1987  * 
Louisiana (LA)  1987  1988 
New Hampshire (NH)  1987  1987 
Oklahoma (OK)  1987  1988 
Texas (TX)  1987  1988 
Washington (WA)  1987  1985 
Wisconsin (WI)  1987  1990 
Wyoming (WY)  1987  1988 
Colorado (CO)  1988  1991 
Delaware (DE)  1988  * 
Mississippi (MS)  1988  1986 
South Dakota (SD)  1988  * 
Vermont (VT)  1988  1970 
West Virginia (WV)  1988  1987 
Arkansas (AR)  1989  1994 
New Mexico (NM)  1989  1991 
Nebraska (NE)  1990  1985 
Iowa (IA)  1991  * 
North Dakota (ND)  1991  1987 
Kansas (KS)  1992  1987 
Montana (MT)  1993  1990 
Hawaii (HI)  Not permitted (as of 1994)  1986 
Branching date reflects when states permitted branching via merger & acquisition (usually before de novo branching permitted).  Dates from 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Interstate Asset Ratios by State: 1976 and 1994
1994
1976
  Not in sample
Interstate Asset
Ratio: *
*Percent of bank assets in a state held by out-of-state bank holding companies (including foreign 
BHCs).Figure III




































Deregulated Before 1985: AK, CT, KY, MA, ME, NY, RI, UT.
Deregulated Between 1985 and 1987: AL, AZ, CA, DC, FL, GA, ID, IL, IN, LA, MD, MI, MN,
MO, NC, NH, NJ, NV, OH, OK, OR, PA, SC, TN, TX, VA, WA, WI, WY.
Deregulated Between 1988 and 1990: AR, CO, MS, NE, NM, VT, WV.
Deregulated After 1990: IA, KS, MT, ND.
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